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Abstract
Community decisions about access control in virtual communities are non-monotonic in
nature. This means that they cannot be expressed in current, monotonic trust management
languages such as the family of Role Based Trust Management languages (RT). To solve
this problem we propose RT⊖, which adds a restricted form of negation to the standard RT
language, thus admitting a controlled form of non-monotonicity. The semantics of RT⊖
is discussed and presented in terms of the well-founded semantics for Logic Programs.
Finally we discuss how chain discovery can be accomplished for RT⊖.
Key words: Distributed Trust Management (DTM), Virtual
Communities (VC), Peer to Peer (P2P), Role Based Trust Management
(RT), Non-monotonic Policies, Chain Discovery.
1 Introduction
Languages from the family of Role Based Trust Management Framework (RT),
like most Trust Management (TM) languages are monotonic: adding a creden-
tial to the system can only result in the granting of additional privileges. Usually,
this property is desirable in policy languages [24]. However, banishing negation
from an access control language is not a realistic option. In fact, as stated by Li
et al. [17] “many security policies are non-monotonic, or more easily specified as
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non-monotonic ones”; similar views are expressed by Barker and Stuckey [2] and
by Wang et al. [27] in the context of logic-based access control. This is also true
for complex distributed systems such as virtual communities. In particular, as we
will show, modelling access control decisions by a community, as opposed to ac-
cess control decisions by an individual member, cannot be made without at least a
form of negation, which we call negation-in-context. As pointed out by Dung and
Thang [7] a TM system should be monotonic with respect to the credential submit-
ted by the client but could be non-monotonic with respect to the site’s local infor-
mation about the client. Our extension allows a TM system to be non-monotonic
not only in a local setting, but also when the context for negation can be provided.
Contributions
We present a significant enhancement to the power of the RT family of trust
management languages by proposing RT⊖, an extension of RT0. More specifically
we:
• add a single new statement type adding negation-in-context to standard RT;
• present and discuss the declarative semantics of RT⊖;
• show that the extension is essential to specify access control policies for virtual
communities.
• describe a chain discovery algorithm for RT⊖.
Currently, we are using RT⊖ to specify and implement virtual community packages
in the context of the Freeband project I-SHARE. In the next section we discuss
how access control policies in virtual communities motivate us to add negation-in-
context to RT. In Section 3 the syntax and informal semantics of RT⊖ is introduced.
The formal semantics of RT⊖ is presented in Section 4. We present related work in
Section 7 and conclusions and future work in Section 8.
2 Virtual Communities
Virtual communities are groups of individuals with a shared interest, relationship or
fantasy [16]. The majority of current virtual communities is interested in sharing
audio/video content using P2P systems [22]. Taking into account the distributed
nature of virtual communities, special mechanisms for access control must be pro-
vided to ensure secure operations at both intra- and inter-community levels. As
it is often impossible to identify strangers [21], trust must be established between
community members and entities from outside the community prior to allowing a
specific access. We adopt the solution of SPKI/SDSI [6], where cryptographic keys
are identified instead of entities. This assumes that each entity is the sole holder of
a particular key. As we do not want to impose a heavy PKI, the initial trust in a new
key will be low, but this trust will increase over time (with good behaviour).
As an example imagine that Alice (A), Bob (B), and Carol (C) decide to form a
virtual community (or just a community for short). At the beginning they are the
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only members of the community, but they welcome others to join. We represent a
community by a list with an entry for each member. Each entry names the com-
munity member and the members it knows about. This knowledge results from
previous interactions with the community members. In this paper, however, when
we say that one knows another community member we we mean that one is capable
of finding this member later if necessary. Thus, the “knows” relation is not neces-
sarily commutative, since one entity can decide to keep track of the other, but not
vice versa. For example the following list represents the community of Alice, Bob,
and Carol:
A[B,C] B[A,C] C[A,B]
In this community all members know each other, which means that each member
can locate any other member when needed. As the community grows it becomes
harder and harder for each member to have complete information about all other
members. Yet the community would like to protect its integrity. Rather than to re-
quire involvement of all members in decision making, a more practical and scalable
approach is to allow decisions about membership to be taken by a group of coor-
dinators selected from the community members. This group of coordinators itself
forms a (sub)community. To find all the coordinators we require that the directed
graph formed by the "knows" relation is strongly connected. This means that each
coordinator has a relationship with at least one other coordinator in such a way
that all coordinators can be reached. For example in the list below A knows B, B
knows C and C knows B and A:
A[B] B[C] C[B,A]
To become a member of a community or to become a new coordinator all the exist-
ing coordinators of a given community must approve. Trust management languages
based on logic programming semantics do not support queries of this kind directly.
If one wants to know “if all coordinators approve entity A” without explicitly enu-
merating these coordinators, one must check if the negation of this statement - “is
there any coordinator that does not approve entity A” - holds. If not, one can con-
clude that all coordinators approve entity A. Existing trust management languages
[18] are strictly monotonic, thus do not allow for negation. For this reason they are
not sufficiently expressive to efficiently model complex collaborations that com-
monly appear in virtual communities.
Before we can elaborate on this using the example just presented, we need to review
the definition of RT0, and then present our extension RT⊖.
3 RT⊖
3.1 The RT0 language
RT0 contains two basic elements: entities and role names. Entities represent uniquely
identified principals, individuals, processes, public keys, etc. Entities are denoted
by names starting with an uppercase letter, for example: A, B, D, and Alice. A
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role name begins with a lower case letter. In RT0, roles are denoted by the en-
tity name followed by the role name, separated by a dot. For instance A.r and
Company.testers are roles. To define role membership, RT0 provides four kinds of
policy statements:
• A.r←− D (Simple Membership). Entity D is a member of the role A.r.
• A.r ←− B.r1 (Simple Inclusion). Every member of B.r1 is also a member of
A.r. This represents delegation from entity A to entity B.
• A.r ←− A.r1.r2 (Linking Inclusion). For every entity X who is a member of
A.r1, every member of X.r2 is also a member of A.r. This statement represents a
delegation from entity A to all the members of the role A.r1. The right-hand side
A.r1.r2 is called a linked role.
• A.r←− B1.r1 ∩ B2.r2 (Intersection Inclusion). Every entity which is a member
of both B.r1 and B.r2 is a member of A.r. This statement represents partial del-
egation from the entity A to B1 and to B2. The right-hand side B1.r1 ∩ B2.r2 is
called an intersection role. In a policy statement A.r ←− e we call A.r the head
and e the body. The set of policy statements having the same head A.r is called the
definition of A.r.
3.2 Extending RT0 with negation
RT0 and other languages from the RT framework do not support negation. As
argued in Section 2, this limits expressiveness. Let us first see an example of nega-
tion to enforce the following separation of concerns policy: “developers cannot be
testers of their own code”. We would like to express in RT something similar to the
LP clause:
verifycode(?A) :- tester(?A), not developer(?A).
where ?A denotes a logical variable. This clause states that A can verify the code
if A is a tester and A is not the developer responsible for the code. RTDT - another
member of the RT framework [18] - supports thresholds and delegation of role
activations; to some extent, RTDT allows to model separation of concerns without
using negation. However, this comes at the cost of having to define manifold roles
(cumbersome to work with, in practice). In any case, the examples we present in
the sequel cannot be modelled in RTDT . We define a new type of statement based
on RT0 and a new role-exclusion operator ⊖:
•A.r ←− B1.r1⊖B2.r2 (Exclusion) All members of B1.r1 which are not members
of B2.r2 are added to A.r.
Example Using the⊖ operator we can solve the separation of concerns problem as
follows:
Company.verifycode ←− Company.tester ⊖ Company.developer. (1)
Suppose that both Alice and Bob are testers but Alice is also a developer of the
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code:
Company.tester ←− Alice Company.tester ←− Bob
Company.developer ←− Alice
We see that credential 1 does not make Alice be a member of the
Company.verifycode role. Thus, only Bob can verify the code.
3.3 Modelling virtual communities using RT⊖
Having given a simple example and its representation in RT⊖, we now return to the
more complex scenario of community decision making from Section 2.
Recall that we have a community of coordinators - Alice (A), Bob (B), and Carol
(C). Assume that another entity - say D - wants to join this community and asks
Alice for approval. Alice can accept D as a new coordinator locally, but before
making the final decision she must check if there is no objection from other coordi-
nators. A coordinator expresses the objection using a so called black list. An entity
that is on the black list of one of the coordinators will not be accepted as a new
coordinator.
Table 1 shows the minimal definition, and the descriptions of the roles used by
coordinators. We see from Table 1 that some roles are mandatory while the others
are not. For instance the role disagreeToAdd must be defined by each coordinator.
On the other hand, the roles allCoord, allCandidates, and addCoord can be defined
as needed by a coordinator. Special attention must be given to the definition of the
disagreeToAdd role. For example, a coordinator can use the following credential to
say that she distrusts any entity she does not accept locally:
A.disagreeToAdd ←− A.allCandidates ⊖ A.agreeToAdd.
If a coordinator trusts other coordinators to select candidates she can leave the
agreeToAdd role empty and use her disagreeToAdd role to block some candidates.
For example, Alice can put E on her black list to disallow E to become a coordina-
tor, and simultaneously accept all other candidates proposed by other coordinators:
A.disagreeToAdd ←− E.
Table 2 shows the roles and their members as seen by Alice, Bob, and Carol. In
this table, we assume that Alice agrees locally to add D as a new coordinator. Also,
Bob and Carol have no objection to add D as a new coordinator, but E is on Alice’s
black list and F is on the black list of Bob and Carol. As a consequence, only D is
the member of the addCoord role of Alice. Bob and Carol do not have to define the
allCoord, allCandidates 9 , objectionToAdd, and addCoord unless they themselves
add a new coordinator.
9 A coordinator must define the allCandidates role if she defines the disagreeToAdd role in terms
of the agreeToAdd role.
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Table 1
Roles used by coordinators
Definition (for coordinator A) Description
Op-
tio-
nal
A.agreeToAdd ←− [set of entities]
A coordinator uses this role to express that she
approves an entity. The role has a local mean-
ing. It is not sufficient to be a member of the
agreeToAdd role to become a coordinator. It
is necessary that no other coordinators says
that an entity is a member of her disagree-
ToAdd role. The agreeToAdd role, through the
allCandidates role, provides context for the⊖
operator in the definition of the the addCoord
role.
A.disagreeToAdd ←−
[see description in the text]
This role is used by a coordinator as a black
list.
A.coord ←− [set of entities] This role contains all the coordinators knownby a coordinator.
A.allCoord ←− A
A.allCoord ←− A.allCoord.coord
This role allows a coordinator to iterate over
all entities connected by the coord role. This
role, if defined, contains all the coordinators.
✓
A.objectionToAdd ←−
A.allCoord.disagreeToAdd
A coordinator can use this role to obtain all
entities for which there is any objection. ✓
A.allCandidates ←−
A.allCoord.agreeToAdd
This role, if defined, contains all the candi-
date coordinators locally accepted by any of
the coordinators. Used as the context for the
⊖ operator in the body of the addCoord role.
✓
A.addCoord ←− A.allCandidates ⊖
A.objectionToAdd
After becoming a member of this role, a can-
didate coordinator becomes a new coordinator
and becomes a member of the coord role.
✓
4 Semantics
The semantics of trust management languages is typically given by a translation
into Logic Programming (LP) [18]. We will follow the same route. Trust man-
agement credentials are by definition distributed among different principals. The
use of negation creates an additional difficulty, also because in logic programming
various different semantics exist to cope with negation. We have chosen to use
the Well-Founded (WF) semantics [10] for the reasons sketched below. The WF
semantics imposes no restrictions on the syntax of programs, provides an unique
model for each program (as opposed to e.g. the stable model semantics [11]) and
enjoys an elegant fixed-point construction.
The WF semantics basically works as follows (we refer the interested reader
to [10] for details): For a program, consisting of a set of rules, one iteratively
builds positive and negative facts. Positive facts are obtained as usual; any fact
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Table 2
Adding a new coordinator - D is successful, E, F fail (ND = Not Defined)
co
o
rd
ag
re
eT
o
A
dd
al
lC
o
o
rd
al
lC
an
di
da
te
s
di
sa
gr
ee
To
A
dd
o
bje
ct
io
n
To
A
dd
ad
dC
o
o
rd
Alice (A) {B} {D} {A,B,C} {D} {E} {E,F} {D}
Bob (B) {C} {} ND ND {F} ND ND
Carol (C) {B,A} {} ND ND {F} ND ND
that can be derived by a rule from the already found facts is added. Negative facts
are obtained from ‘unfounded sets’ which contain currently undecided facts which
no rule can derived even when the elements of this set are set from undecided to
false. Thus setting this unfounded set to false will not create contradictions. As we
cannot always obtain a positive or negative version of each fact, some atoms will
remain undecided and be assigned the value ‘undefined’, i.e. the WF semantics is
three valued.
In a TM system it is impossible to avoid circular references, and we cannot ex-
pect policies to be (locally) stratified. Stratification basically means that one can
restructure a logic program into separate parts in such a way that negative refer-
ences from one part refer only to previously defined parts. Without the possibility
of local stratification we cannot refer to the perfect model semantics [23]. For the
same reason, we certainly have to refer to a three valued semantics: Next to the
truth values true and false, we have to admit the valued undefined. In short, this
is because we cannot expect the completion of a policy to be a consistent logic
program in the sense described in [25].
The handling of positive circular references, as in {A.r ←− B.r B.r ←−
A.r} should be done in accordance with the semantics of RT0; we should obtain
that some entities, for example C, do not belong to A.r. This forces us to exclude
Kunen’s semantics [15] (i.e. the semantics of logical consequences of the com-
pletion of the program together with the weak domain closure assumptions), and
Fitting’s semantics [9]: in both semantics the query “does C belong to A.r?” would
return undefined. The WF semantics does return false for this membership query.
Example 4.1 Consider the program P with the following clauses:
p :- q. q :- p. r :- ¬q. s :- ¬t. t :- ¬s. u :- ¬s.
In the well-founded model of P we have that p and q are false, r is true and s, t, and
u are undefined. (On the other hand, all predicates would be undefined in Kunen’s
semantics.)
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4.1 Translating RT⊖ to GLP
We first give the translation to LP for RT0 and, using this translation, the semantics
of a set of RT0 policy statements. Next we extend this to a translation from RT⊖ to
GLP and the semantics for a set of RT⊖ policy statements.
The semantics of a set of RT0 policy statements is commonly defined by translating
it into a logic program [18]. Here, we depart from the approach of Li et al. [18] by
referring to the role names as predicate symbols. The statement A.r ←− D is, for
example, translated to r(A,D) in the Prolog program. Intuitively, r(A,D) means
that D is a member of the role A.r.
Definition 4.2 Given a set P of RT0 policy statements, the semantic program,
SP (P), for P is the logic program defined as follows (recall that symbols start-
ing with “?” represent logical variables):
• For each A.r ←− D ∈ P add to SP (P) the clause r(A,D)
• For each A.r ←− B.r1 ∈ P add to SP (P) the clause r(A, ?Z) :- r1(B, ?Z)
• For eachA.r ←− A.r1.r2 ∈ P add to SP (P) the clause r(A, ?Z) :- r1(A, ?Y ),
r2(?Y, ?Z)
• For each A.r ←− B1.r1 ∩ B2.r2 ∈ P add to SP (P) the clause r(A, ?Z) :-
r1(B1, ?Z), r2(B2, ?Z)
The semantics of a role A.r is a set of members Z that make the predicate r(A,Z)
true in the semantic program: [[A.r]]P = {Z |SP (P) |= r(A,Z)}
We write SP (P ) |= r(A,Z) if r(A,Z) is true in the unique well-founded model of
P . (For negation-free programs this model coincides with the least Herbrand model
used for the semantics of RT0 by Li at al [18].) We now extend the translation of
RT0 to that of RT⊖ by adding the translation of the exclusion rule.
Definition 4.3 Given a set P of RT⊖ policy statements, the semantic program,
SP (P), for P is the general logic program defined as follows:
• For each A.r ←− B.r1 ⊖ B.r2 ∈ P add to SP (P) the clause r(A, ?Z) :-
r1(B1, ?Z),¬r2(B2, ?Z)
• All other rules are as in definition 4.2.
The semantics of a role A.r is a set of members Z that make the predicate r(A,Z)
true in the semantic program: [[A.r]]P = {Z |SP (P) |= r(A,Z)}
Note that, unlike before, the value of the semantical program may give value ‘un-
defined’ for r(A,Z). In this case the agent Z is not considered to be a member of
the role, nor of the negated role.
Example 4.4 Consider a system with entities A,B,C,D, roles A.r, B.r and C.r
and the following policy rules:
A.r ←− B.r ⊖ C.r C.r ←− B.r ⊖A.r B.r ←− D
Here D is a member of B.r, however, D is not a member of either A.r or C.r. Note
that as a result we have that despite the presence of the rule A.r ←− B.r⊖C.r the
role B.r can have members that are neither in A.r nor in C.r.
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The rules for A.r and C.r in the example above are referred to as negative circular
dependencies; A.r depends negatively on C.r and C.r, in turn, depends negatively
on A.r. The example shows that care is required when reasoning about policies
which have negative circular dependencies.
4.2 Virtual Communities - translation to GLP
Having introduced an example of virtual community decision making in Section 2,
its formalism in Subsection 3.3, we now give the GLP semantics of the example.
Translating RT⊖ credentials to GLP is straightforward using the rules presented in
Subsection 4.1. For the convenience of the reader we present a complete policy
and the corresponding GLP rules in Appendix A. If one asks Alice to add D to
the group of coordinators she needs to check if D is a member of the A.addCoord.
This is equivalent to checking whether addCoord(A,D) holds after the translation to
GLP. She does this by checking whether D is a logical consequence of the semantic
program SP (P) by first finding the semantics of the role A.addCoord and checking
if it contains entity D. The semantics of the role A.addCoord with respect to the
program P is as follows:
JA.addCoordKP = {D}.
The semantics of the roles A.allCandidates and A.objectionToAdd (these roles de-
fine the role A.addCoord) are shown below:
JA.allCandidatesKP = {D} JA.objectionToAddKP = {E, F}.
The semantics of a role may also be an empty set: JB.agreeToAddKP = {}.
5 Credential Chain Discovery
In this section we extend the standard chain discovery algorithm to RT⊖ following
the construction of the well-founded semantics. Recall that the definition of a role
A.r is the set of all credentials with head A.r. We assume that A stores (or at
least, is able to find) the complete definition of each of her roles A.r, i.e. that the
credentials involved are issuer-traceable. The main difficulty in the chain discovery
is to obtain that B is not a member of a linked role A.r.r′. For this we need to check
that every potential member C of A.r does not have B in its role C.r′. So who are
the potential members of A.r? Thanks to negation in context we can provide a
reasonable overestimation of this set using chain discovery for RT0:
Definition 5.1 For a policy P the context policy P+ is the policy obtained by
replacing each credential of the form A.r ←− B1.r1⊖B2.r2 ∈ P by A.r ←− B1.r1
and leaving the other credentials unchanged. We call [[A.r]]P+ the context of the
role A.r.
The following lemma relates roles with their contexts.
9
Czenko, Tran, Doumen, Etalle, Hartel, den Hartog
Lemma 5.2 For any policy P and role A.r we have: If SP (P) |= r(A,B) then
SP (P+) |= r(A,B) and if SP (P+) 6|= r(A,B) then SP (P) |= ¬r(A,B).
The first part of this lemma states that any role is contained in its context, [[A.r]]P ⊆
[[A.r]]P+. If B 6∈ [[A.r]]P this means that r(A,B) is undefined or false in SP (P).
The second part of the lemma states that if B 6∈ [[A.r]]P+ it must be the latter,
r(A,B) is false in SP (P). In the algorithm below we build a set of credentials
C together with a set of context membership facts I+ and a set of positive and
negative membership facts I.
Step 1. Initialise I = ∅, I+ = ∅ and C = the definition of role A.r.
Step 2. Discover context and credentials (classical chain discovery for I+ and C).
We look for new credentials top down; any credential that could possibly be rel-
evant for role A.r is added to C. We look for the context of A.r bottom up; any
fact that can be derived from the credentials that we have found is added to I+.
Repeat the following until no changes occur: For each credential of the following
form in C:
[B.r0 ←− C] add r0(B,C) to I+
[B.r0 ←− C.r1] add the definition of C.r1 to C and add r0(B,D) to I+ for all
r1(C,D) in I+
[B.r0 ←− C1.r1 ∩ C2.r2] add the definitions of C1.r1 and C2.r2 to C add
r0(B,D) to I+ whenever r1(C1, D) and r2(C2, D) in I+.
[B.r0 ←− C.r1.r2] add the definition of C.r1 and, for each r1(C,D) ∈ I+,
the definition of D.r2 to C. Add r0(B,D) to I+ whenever for some Y we have
r1(C, Y ) and r2(Y,D) in I+.
[B.r0 ←− C1.r1 ⊖ C2.r2] add the definitions of C1.r1 and C2.r2 to C, add
r0(B,D) to I+ for every r1(C1, D)
Step 3. Discover positive facts in I (extended chain discovery 1).
We update I similar to I+ in the previous step, only the last case (⊖) changes.
Repeat until I does not change, for credentials in C of the following form:
[B.r0 ←− C] add r0(B,C) to I
[B.r0 ←− C.r1] add r0(B,D) to I for all r1(C,D) in I
[B.r0 ←− C1.r1∩C2.r2] add r0(B,D) to I whenever r1(C1, D) and r2(C2, D)
in I.
[B.r0 ←− C.r1.r2] Add r0(B,D) to I whenever for some Y we have r1(C, Y )
and r2(Y,D) in I.
[B.r0 ←− C1.r1 ⊖ C2.r2] add r0(B,D) to I whenever r1(C1, D) ∈ I and
either (¬r2(C2, D)) ∈ I or r2(C2, D) 6∈ I+.
Step 4. Discover negative facts in I (extended chain discovery 2).
We search for facts which are useful when negated in I: InitialiseU = ∅. We say an
atom r(X, Y ) is not yet false (NYF) if it is a member of the context and not assumed
or known to be false, i.e. r(X, Y ) ∈ I+, r(X, Y ) 6∈ U and ¬r(X, Y ) 6∈ I. A fact
r2(C2, D) is useful if it is not yet false and ¬r2(C2, D) can be used to derive a fact,
i.e. B.r0 ←− C1.r1 ⊖ C2.r2 ∈ C and r1(C1, D) ∈ I. Choose one useful fact and
add it to U .
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Next we try to show that facts in U are false by showing that no rule can possibly
derive a fact in U . To achieve this we may need to assume that other facts are also
false, i.e. add them to U .
For each fact r(B,D) in U and matching rule B.r ←− e ∈ C perform:
[B.r ←− C] Do nothing.
[B.r ←− C.r1] This rule cannot be used to derive r(B,D) if r1(C,D) is false
thus if r1(C,D) is NYF then add it to U .
[B.r ←− C1.r1 ∩C2.r2] If r1(C1, D) and r2(C2, D) are both NYF then choose
one to add to U .
[B.r ←− C1.r1 ⊖ C2.r2] If r1(C1, D) is NYF and r2(C2, D) 6∈ I then add
r1(C1, D) to U .
[B.r ←− C.r1.r2] For all Y with r1(C, Y ) NYF: If r2(Y,D) is NYF choose
one of r1(C, Y ) and r2(Y,D) and add it to U .
⋆ Try each possible choice in the substep above and if the resulting U has no
elements in common with I then add ¬U to I.
Repeat steps 3 and 4 until I remains unchanged.
(End of algorithm.) The algorithm correctly finds the members of the role A.r:
∀B : r(A,B) ∈ I ⇐⇒ B ∈ [[A.r]]P
It follows the steps in the construction of the well-founded semantics in such a way
that I is, at each stage, a sufficiently large subset of the well-founded model.
6 Implementation
In the current prototype storage is centralised and we assume that all credentials
can be traced by the issuer. In such a case, Linear resolution with Selection func-
tion for General logic programs (SLG) resolution of XSB prolog can be used to
compute answers to queries according to the WF model for RT⊖ [5]. XSB is
a research-oriented, commercial-grade Logic Programming system for Unix and
Windows-based platforms. XSB provides standard prolog functionality but also
supports negations and constraints. Using SLG resolution XSB prolog can cor-
rectly answer queries for which standard prolog gets lost in an infinite branch of a
search tree, where it may loop infinitely. A number of interfaces to other software
systems including Java and ODBC are available. DLV datalog [8] and the Smod-
els system [20] can also be used to provide an initial implementation of RT⊖. The
DLV system [8] is a system for disjunctive logic programs. It is distributed as a
command line tool for both Windows and Linux operation systems. DLV is capa-
ble of dealing with disjunctive logic programs without function symbols allowing
for strong negations, constraints and queries. DLV uses two different notions of
negation: negation as failure and true (or explicit) negation. By default, DLV han-
dles negation as failure by constructing the stable model semantics for the program.
This standard behaviour can be changed using a command line option and then a
WF model is built instead. The true or explicit negation expresses the facts that
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explicitly are known to be false. On the contrary, negation as failure does not sup-
port explicit assertion of falsity. Models of programs containing true negation are
also called “answer sets”. The Smodels system [20] provides an implementation of
the well-founded and stable model semantics for range-restricted function-free nor-
mal programs. The Smodels system allows for efficient handling of non-stratified
ground programs and supports extensions including built-in functions, cardinality,
and weight constraints. The Smodels system is available either as a C++ library
that can be called from user programs or as a stand-alone program with default
front-end (lparse). We implemented the program introduced in sub-section 4.3 on
three systems: XSB, Smodels and DLV. To test the performance of the program
on these systems, we use two parameters: number of coordinators (Coords) and
number of iterations (Iters). The higher the number of coordinators is, the more
complex the program is. The program is also executed repeatedly to compare per-
formance more correctly. Table A.2 in the appendix reports the execution time of
the program measured by the CPU time obtained. We cannot compare the execu-
tion time between XSB and the other two DLV and Smodels because XSB is the
goal-oriented system while DLV and Smodels build and return the whole model
for the program. Because of this XSB is faster than the other two systems. DLV
provides better execution time than Smodels, especially when the complexity of the
program increases.
7 Related Work
So far little attention has been given to trust management in virtual communities.
Most of the existing approaches focus on reputation-based trust models in P2P net-
works [26]. Abdul-Rahman and Hailes [1] propose a trust model that is based
on real world social trust characteristics. They also find formal logic based trust
management to be ill suited as a general model of trust. To prove this claim they
refer to the early work of Burrows and Abadi [4], and Gong, Needham, and Ya-
halom [12], which are more relevant to formal protocol verification than to formal
reasoning on trust management. To support their work they claim that logic based
trust management systems are not suitable to be automated - the existing literature
on automated trust negotiation (ATN) yields a contradictory statement (see Sea-
mons et al. [24]). Pearlman et al. [21] present a Community Authorisation Service
- a central management unit for a community that helps to enforce the policy of a
virtual community. Such a central point of responsibility does not fit well in the
spirit of P2P networks because of their highly distributed nature. Pearlman et al.
also require that there a centralised policy exists for a virtual community. How-
ever, the policy of a virtual community may have a distributed character and can
be seen as a product of the policies of the community members. Boella and van
der Torre [3] take the same direction and emphasise the distinction between autho-
risations given by the Community Authorisation Service and permissions granted
by resource providers in virtual communities of agents. They regard authorisation
as a means used by community authorities to regulate the access of customers to
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resources that are not under control of these authorities. According to Boella and
van der Torre, permission can be granted only by the actual resource owner.
As we conclude in Section 2, virtual communities are also not supported by
the existing trust management languages, even though the general requirements for
such languages have been investigated [24].
Herzberg et al. propose in [13] a prolog-based trust management language
(DTPL) together with a non-monotonic version of it (TPL). Their approach is very
different from ours in the sense that TLP allows for negative certificates namely
“certificates which are interpreted as suggestions not to trust a user”. This far-
reaching approach leads to a more complex logical interpretation, which includes
conflict resolution. As opposed to this, our approach is technically simpler and
enjoys a well-established semantics. Jajodia et al. [14], Wang et al. [27], Barker
and Stuckey [2], have in common that they impose a stratified use of negation. Be-
cause of this, they can refer to the perfect model semantics. As we explained in
Section 4, in the context of DTM, we cannot expect policies to be stratified. Our
approach is thus more powerful than the approaches based on the stratifiable nega-
tion. Dung and Thang in [7] propose a DTM system based on logic programming
and the stable model semantics [11].
8 Conclusions and future work
We present the language RT⊖, which adds a construct for ‘negation-in-context’ to
the RT0 trust management system. We argue the necessity of such a construct and il-
lustrate its use with scenarios from virtual communities which cannot be expressed
within the RT framework.
We provide a semantics for RT⊖ by translation to general logic programs. We
show that, given the complete policy, the membership relation can be decided by
running the translation in systems such as XSB, DLV datalog and Smodels. We
also show how, for the case that credentials are issuer traceable [19], the chain
discovery algorithm for RT0 can be extended to RT⊖. We are currently employing
RT⊖ to specify virtual community policies in the Freeband project I-SHARE. In the
future we plan to examine the complexity of the presented chain discovery algo-
rithm, ad hoc methods to minimise communication overhead, and safe methods for
chain discovery in non-‘issuer traces all’ scenarios. A comparison with reputation
systems will also be made.
In section 5 we have assumed that the credentials are issuer traceable and that
we are able to obtain all relevant credentials. In our scenario this is realistic; as
the coordinators play a central role, they are generally assumed to be available
sufficiently often and have sufficient resources to store their own credentials. In
general collecting all credentials can be difficult, for example, credentials may be
stored elsewhere, entities may be unreachable or messages may be lost. In such
a situation, we cannot safely determine that A is not in B’s role r by absence of
credentials. Instead we could ask B to explicitly state that A is not a member of
B.r. This is sufficient if we know the context of a role (and thus which negative
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facts we need). More advanced mechanisms to guarantee safety of roles and a
precise definition of which policies are safe using which mechanism is subject of
further research.
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Appendix A
Table A.1
Virtual Community - translation to GLP
RT⊖ rules GLP semantics
A.addCoord ←− A.allCandidates ⊖
A.objectionToAdd
A.allCandidates ←−
A.allCoord.agreeToAdd
A.objectionToAdd ←−
A.allCoord.disagreeToAdd
A.disagreeToAdd ←− A.allCandidates ⊖
A.agreeToAdd
A.allCoord ←− A.allCoord.coord
A.allCoord ←− A
A.coord ←− B
B.coord ←− C
C.coord ←− B
C.coord ←− A
A.agreeToAdd ←− D
A.disagreeToAdd ←− E
B.disagreeToAdd ←− F
C.disagreeToAdd ←− F
addCoord(A, ?Y ):- allCandidates(A, ?Y ),
¬objectionToAdd(A, ?Y ).
allCandidates(A, ?Y ):- allCoord(A, ?Z),
agreeToAdd(?Z, ?Y ).
objectionToAdd(A, ?Y ):- allCoord(A, ?Z),
disagreeToAdd(?Z, ?Y ).
disagreeToAdd(A, ?Y ):- allCandidates(A, ?Y ),
¬agreeToAdd(A, ?Y ).
allCoord(A, ?Y ):- allCoord(A, ?Z),
coord(?Z, ?Y ).
allCoord(A,A).
coord(A,B).
coord(B,C).
coord(C,B).
coord(C,A).
agreeToAdd(A,D).
disagreeToAdd(A,E).
disagreeToAdd(B,F ).
disagreeToAdd(C,F ).
Table A.2
Execution time of the program on the XSB, SMODELS, and DLV systems
10 Coords 30 Coords 50 Coords
Num. of Iterations Num. of Iterations Num. of Iterations
1 10 20 1 10 20 1 10 20
DLV 0.05s 0.81s 1.54s 0.06s 0.83s 1.55s 0.07s 0.86s 1.60s
SMODELS 0.12s 1.22s 2.32s 0.16s 1.35s 2.66s 0.19s 1.53s 2.94s
XSB ≈ 0
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